Microsoft II (1995-2014)
In 1999, Microsoft became the most valuable company in the world. And in 2019, Microsoft became the most valuable company in the world, again. But… what happened in the twenty years in between?
In 1999, Microsoft became the most valuable company in the world. And in 2019, Microsoft became the most valuable company in the world, again. But… what happened in the twenty years in between? The answer, as we discovered in our research, is probably not what you think.
In this episode Ben adn David explore and analyze the browser wars and the DOJ case, Windows XP through 8, Surface, Xbox, search, Yahoo!, Bing, the iPhone, Nokia, mobile, social, Facebook… and oh yeah, a little thing called Azure and the enterprise — which ended up becoming so big that no failures mattered.
Kyle’s Rating: 7/10
This episode had solid storytelling with comprehensive research, but the episode began to drag as it covered Microsoft's doldrums period, which proved less compelling than the company's rise or renaissance. The episode effectively challenges the conventional wisdom that Steve Ballmer's tenure represented Microsoft's "lost years," demonstrating instead that this period saw the company triple revenue and profits while building the enterprise foundation that enabled later cloud dominance
Company Overview
Company: Microsoft Corporation
Founding Year: 1975
Headquarters: Redmond, Washington
Microsoft's core business encompasses software platforms, productivity applications, and cloud services, having evolved from a personal computer software company to a comprehensive enterprise technology provider. The company's significance lies in its transformation from the world's most valuable company in 1999 to facing existential threats, only to reclaim the top position by 2019 through strategic pivots to cloud computing and enterprise services.
Narrative
Microsoft's journey from 1995 to 2014 represents one of the most complex corporate transformations in technology history, defying the conventional narrative of decline. The story begins with Microsoft at the peak of its consumer technology dominance, having just launched Windows 95 to unprecedented fanfare, yet facing an existential threat it barely recognized: the Internet and Netscape's browser threatening to reduce Windows to "a poorly debugged set of device drivers."
The browser wars that followed demonstrated Microsoft's strategic acumen at its finest. When Netscape went public in August 1995 with a $3 billion valuation, Microsoft immediately recognized the threat and responded with characteristic decisiveness. Bill Gates's "Internet Tidal Wave" memo declared the Internet "the most important single development since the IBM PC," and Microsoft's response was swift and devastating. By making Internet Explorer free and bundling it with Windows, Microsoft leveraged its distribution monopoly to systematically dismantle Netscape's market position, reducing the company's browser share from 70% to near-zero by 2000.
However, this victory came at an enormous cost that would define the next decade. The Department of Justice's antitrust case, while ultimately settled without breaking up the company, inflicted profound cultural and psychological damage. The embarrassing videotaped deposition of Bill Gates, the months of uncertainty about potential corporate dissolution, and the constant legal scrutiny created what one executive described as "a mental breakdown for the whole company." This period fundamentally changed Bill Gates, leading to his transition from CEO to Chief Software Architect in 2000, with Steve Ballmer taking operational control.
Under Ballmer's leadership, Microsoft discovered its true calling in the enterprise market, building what would become one of the most profitable business models in corporate history. The company systematically developed a comprehensive enterprise stack—SQL Server, Exchange, Active Directory, SharePoint—all designed to work seamlessly together and sold through revolutionary Enterprise Agreements that transformed one-time software sales into recurring annuities. This enterprise transformation was masterful, creating unbreakable switching costs that generated predictable, growing revenue streams from the world's largest corporations.
Yet even as Microsoft built this enterprise fortress, it stumbled repeatedly in consumer technology. Windows Vista became a cautionary tale of engineering hubris, consuming the company's best talent for five years while producing an operating system that confused users and frustrated OEM partners. The subsequent Windows 8 experiment, while technically innovative with its touch-first Metro interface, fundamentally misread the market by forcing tablet metaphors onto desktop users. These failures weren't merely product missteps—they represented Microsoft's inability to maintain relevance with consumers and developers, ceding mindshare to Apple's resurgent iPhone and iPad ecosystems.
Perhaps most significantly, Microsoft consistently arrived at transformative markets with the right vision but wrong execution. The company pioneered concepts like tablet computing, touch interfaces, and mobile platforms years before they became mainstream, yet repeatedly missed the mark on implementation details that mattered. Windows Mobile predated the iPhone by years but remained trapped in the enterprise mindset of PCs scaled down, rather than embracing the consumer-first approach that Apple would perfect.
The period's hidden triumph was the quiet development of Azure, beginning in 2005 under Ray Ozzie's leadership and Dave Cutler's engineering genius. This cloud platform, codenamed "Red Dog," represented Microsoft's most important strategic bet since Windows itself. While the company publicly struggled with consumer products and faced narrative challenges about its relevance, it was simultaneously building the infrastructure that would enable its eventual return to technology leadership. The transformation of the Server & Tools division under Satya Nadella's leadership from 2011 onward laid the groundwork for Microsoft's cloud-first renaissance.
Remarkably, Microsoft's relationship with government regulators underwent a complete reversal during this era. The company that was once viewed as the ultimate monopolist threatening to stifle innovation transformed itself into the technology industry's most trusted partner to governments worldwide. Through Brad Smith's leadership as General Counsel and later President, Microsoft systematically rebuilt its reputation, settling all outstanding legal disputes and establishing itself as a reliable partner for government technology infrastructure. This transformation proved prescient—today, Microsoft stands as the only major technology company not facing significant antitrust scrutiny, while Google, Apple, Amazon, and Meta all face various government investigations and regulatory challenges.
Timeline
1995: Windows 95 launches without Internet Explorer initially bundled
1995: Netscape IPO at $3 billion valuation; Microsoft makes IE free and bundles with Windows
1998: DOJ files major antitrust lawsuit against Microsoft
2000: Judge Jackson orders Microsoft breakup; Bill Gates steps down as CEO, Steve Ballmer takes over
2001: Windows XP launches; Microsoft settles DOJ case; Xbox launches
2005: Ray Ozzie writes Internet Services Disruption memo
2006: Windows Vista launches; Red Dog (Azure) project begins under Ray Ozzie
2007: iPhone announcement; Microsoft attempts $47 billion Yahoo acquisition
2008: Windows 7 development begins under Steven Sinofsky
2009: Bing launches; Windows 7 ships successfully
2010: iPad launch threatens PC market
2011: Windows Phone launches; Nokia partnership begins
2012: Windows 8 ships with controversial Metro interface; Surface launches
2013: Nokia acquisition for $7 billion; Steve Ballmer announces retirement
2014: Satya Nadella becomes CEO; Bill Gates steps down as chairman
Notable Facts
Microsoft's market capitalization dropped from $600 billion to $270 billion (55% decline) during the antitrust proceedings and remained flat throughout Steve Ballmer's 14-year tenure despite tripling revenue and profits
By 2007, 55% of Microsoft's revenue came from multi-year Enterprise Agreements, fundamentally transforming the company's business model from transactional software sales to recurring enterprise annuities
The company spent over $15 billion on major acquisitions during this period (aQuantive, Skype, Nokia) while missing opportunities like the $47 billion Yahoo bid that would have included a 40% stake in Alibaba
Windows XP became the most successful operating system in history, selling over 500 million copies and remaining on 75% of corporate PCs three years after Vista's launch
Microsoft's enterprise business grew consistently throughout this period, becoming the foundation for later cloud dominance, while consumer products repeatedly failed to gain meaningful market share against Apple and Google
The Antitrust Crucible
Microsoft's antitrust saga represents one of the most significant corporate legal battles in American business history, fundamentally reshaping both the company's trajectory and the broader technology industry's relationship with government regulation. The case originated in 1990 when the Federal Trade Commission began investigating Microsoft's per-processor licensing arrangements, leading to a 1993 deadlock vote that should have ended government scrutiny. However, in an unprecedented move, the Department of Justice picked up the investigation the following month, effectively subjecting Microsoft to double jeopardy for the same alleged violations.
The DOJ's renewed investigation culminated in the massive 1998 lawsuit alleging that Microsoft had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by abusing its monopoly power to suppress competition. The case centered on Microsoft's bundling of Internet Explorer with Windows, which the government argued violated a 1994 consent decree prohibiting product tying. Microsoft maintained that IE was an integrated feature rather than a separate product, leading to bizarre courtroom moments where the company shipped deliberately broken versions of Windows when ordered to remove the browser.
The legal proceedings reached their nadir with Bill Gates's 20-hour videotaped deposition in August 1998. Originally intended only for transcript use, the recordings were later allowed as evidence, providing prosecutor David Boies with devastating material. The videos showed Gates being evasive, argumentative, and dismissive, arguing over the definition of basic words and claiming ignorance of well-documented company strategies. These recordings, strategically deployed throughout the trial, systematically destroyed Microsoft's credibility and became symbolic of corporate arrogance.
Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson's November 1999 finding of fact declared Microsoft a monopoly, followed by his June 2000 ruling ordering the company's breakup into separate operating system and applications companies. The remedy would have required Bill Gates and Steve Ballmer to work at different companies and divest their holdings in each other's businesses. Microsoft's market capitalization plummeted 55% during this period, from $600 billion to $270 billion, as investors grappled with the possibility of forced dissolution.
The case's resolution came through a combination of legal technicalities and political changes. Judge Jackson was removed after revelations that he had secretly met with reporters before issuing his rulings, undermining the legal proceedings' integrity. The September 11, 2001 attacks and the transition from the Clinton to Bush administration created pressure for settlement. The final November 2001 agreement reversed the breakup order while maintaining the monopoly finding, imposing relatively minor restrictions on Microsoft's business practices.
The true cost of the antitrust case wasn't financial but cultural and strategic. For over a decade—from 1990 to 2011—Microsoft operated under various forms of government scrutiny, consuming management attention and constraining strategic flexibility during the Internet's formative years. The experience created what employees described as a "mental breakdown" for the company, fostering internal divisions and risk aversion that hampered innovation in emerging markets like search, social networking, and mobile platforms. Paradoxically, this dark period also forced Microsoft to develop the diplomatic and compliance capabilities that would later make it the technology industry's most trusted government partner.
Foundational Memos
Microsoft's strategic evolution during this period was punctuated by a series of influential internal memos that shaped the company's direction and response to emerging technologies. These documents provide crucial insight into how Microsoft's leadership recognized and attempted to address existential threats to their business model.
Windows: The Next Killer Application on the Internet (January 1994) - Written by James Allard, a young Windows networking engineer, this foundational memo identified the Mosaic web browser from the University of Illinois as an "exponential phenomenon" that Microsoft needed to "embrace and extend." The memo introduced the famous "embrace, extend, innovate" strategy that would become central to Microsoft's approach to new technologies. Allard's prescient analysis came months before Netscape was even founded, demonstrating remarkable foresight about the Internet's potential to become an application platform that could "commoditize the underlying operating system."
Cornell is Wired! (February 1994) - Steven Sinofsky wrote this memo after being stranded during a snowstorm while recruiting at Cornell University. He observed students using the Internet not for academic purposes but for social interaction, class registration, and entertainment, capturing the critical insight that the Internet was transitioning from an academic tool to a consumer platform. Bill Gates later credited this memo with making him "take the Internet quite seriously," leading to the April 1994 "internet offsite" that would redirect Microsoft's entire strategic focus.
Internet Tidal Wave (May 1995) - Bill Gates's most famous and consequential memo, written for public consumption, declared the Internet "the most important single development to come along since the IBM PC was introduced in 1981" and "even more important than the arrival of the graphical user interface." This memo served both as internal marching orders and external signaling that Microsoft recognized the Internet as central to computing's future. Significantly, the memo explicitly identified Netscape as a competitor "pursuing a multi-platform strategy where they move the key API into the client to commoditize the underlying operating system," demonstrating Microsoft's full understanding of the existential threat posed by web-based application platforms.
Internet Services Disruption (October 2005) - Ray Ozzie's memo provided the intellectual foundation for Microsoft's cloud transformation. Writing as the newly appointed Chief Software Architect replacing Bill Gates, Ozzie argued that "services-based economics of scale" would enable businesses to "reduce infrastructure costs or deploy solutions as needed and on a subscription basis." This memo directly led to the Red Dog project that became Azure, representing Microsoft's recognition that software delivery models were fundamentally shifting from licensed products to cloud services.
These memos collectively illustrate Microsoft's ability to recognize technological inflection points, even when the company struggled to execute on those insights. The Internet Tidal Wave memo enabled Microsoft's dominance in the browser wars, while Ozzie's services memo laid the groundwork for the cloud business that would eventually restore Microsoft's technology leadership. However, the gap between recognition and execution—evident in Microsoft's struggles with mobile platforms, social networking, and consumer products—highlights the difference between strategic vision and tactical implementation.
Bing: The Search for Relevance
Microsoft's entry into search represents both the company's persistent ambition to compete in high-value Internet markets and its systematic underestimation of the returns to scale in digital advertising. Initially dismissing search as merely a feature of MSN, Microsoft awakened too late to Google's demonstration that search-based advertising could generate extraordinary profit margins. The company's belated recognition led to the failed $47 billion Yahoo acquisition attempt in 2008, forcing Microsoft to build organically through Bing's 2009 launch.
Despite never achieving more than 15-20% market share, Bing proved strategically valuable beyond its direct financial contribution. The platform provided Microsoft with crucial experience in large-scale distributed computing, real-time web services, and advertising marketplace operations—technical capabilities that proved essential for Azure's development. Additionally, Bing's development attracted talent like Satya Nadella, who would later apply search-derived technical expertise to Microsoft's cloud transformation.
The Yahoo Acquisition That Never Was
Microsoft's attempted $47 billion acquisition of Yahoo in 2008 represented the company's desperate need for search scale and systematic undervaluation of strategic Internet assets. The acquisition's financial logic was compelling: Yahoo's Asian assets were worth over $30 billion, meaning Microsoft was effectively paying only $15 billion for Yahoo's search business—approximately $1 billion per percentage point of market share in what would become a $100+ billion annual market. The deal collapsed during final negotiations at Boeing Field due to cultural misalignment rather than financial disagreement.
The missed opportunity became starkly apparent when Alibaba went public in 2014 with Yahoo's 40% stake valued at $92 billion—more than double Microsoft's entire proposed acquisition price. This episode illustrated the company's struggle to recognize and value Internet platform businesses operating under different economic models than traditional software companies, representing one of the most significant missed opportunities in technology acquisition history.
Xbox: Strategic Importance But Low Profits
Microsoft's entry into console gaming through Xbox represented the company's consumer hardware ambitions and complex relationship with profitability versus strategic positioning. From 2006 to 2010, the Entertainment and Devices division generated approximately $32 billion in revenue while producing only $1.3 billion in total operating profit—margins that paled compared to Microsoft's enterprise businesses. Yet Xbox's strategic value extended beyond direct financial contribution, establishing Microsoft's credibility with a new generation of consumers who had largely abandoned the company's other products.
Xbox Live emerged as the platform's most significant innovation, creating one of the first successful subscription-based online gaming services with 40 million subscribers by 2012. This pioneering work in always-on cloud services and real-time multiplayer infrastructure provided Microsoft with invaluable experience in operating large-scale consumer Internet services that directly contributed to later cloud computing capabilities, though it also consumed significant engineering talent that might have been deployed toward emerging threats in search or mobile platforms.
Product Successes and Failures
Major Successes:
Windows XP (2001): Unified the consumer and enterprise Windows lines under the NT architecture while maintaining user-friendly interfaces. Succeeded by providing stability, security, and compatibility that Vista would later lack, selling over 500 million copies and remaining the enterprise standard for over a decade.
Enterprise Agreements: Revolutionary business model transformation that converted one-time software sales into recurring annual contracts. Succeeded by creating predictable revenue streams and higher customer lifetime value while reducing sales friction for large organizations.
Xbox Live: Pioneered subscription-based online gaming with 40 million subscribers by 2012. Succeeded by creating recurring revenue and providing Microsoft with crucial experience in large-scale cloud services that informed Azure development.
SQL Server: Became a viable alternative to Oracle and IBM databases for enterprise customers. Succeeded by leveraging Windows integration and x86 cost advantages over expensive Unix systems.
Major Failures:
Windows Vista (2006): Attempted to revolutionize Windows with new graphics engine, file system (WinFS), and security model. Failed due to hardware requirements that OEMs couldn't meet economically, user confusion over new interfaces, and development complexity that delayed release for five years.
Windows Phone: Mobile operating system launched in 2009 to compete with iPhone and Android. Failed because Microsoft maintained traditional licensing model against Google's free Android, arrived years late to market, and couldn't overcome app ecosystem disadvantages.
Zune (2006): Digital music player and service designed to compete with iPod. Failed by arriving years after iPod dominance was established, lacking iTunes-equivalent software ecosystem, and failing to differentiate meaningfully from existing MP3 players.
Bing Search: Launched in 2009 to compete with Google's search dominance. Achieved technical competence but failed to gain significant market share beyond 15-20%, demonstrating the insurmountable network effects and switching costs in mature search markets.
Windows 8 (2012): Touch-first operating system designed for tablet computing. Failed by forcing tablet metaphors onto desktop users, confusing existing customers, and arriving after iPad had already defined tablet computing paradigms.
Mixed Results:
Surface (2012): Microsoft's entry into hardware manufacturing. Initially struggled with poor sales and write-offs but eventually established a profitable premium device category, demonstrating Microsoft's ability to compete in hardware while validating the tablet-laptop hybrid concept.
Steve Ballmer
When Steve Ballmer assumed the CEO role in January 2000, he inherited a company facing its greatest existential crisis since founding. The antitrust trial threatened corporate dissolution, consumer technology leadership was under attack from new Internet platforms, and the founder-CEO who had defined the company's identity was stepping back from operational leadership. Ballmer's response was structured around three critical priorities that would define his 14-year tenure.
His first priority was emotionally holding the company together during the antitrust crisis. With employees uncertain about their company's future existence and facing constant negative press coverage, Ballmer became Microsoft's emotional anchor. His famous on-stage performances—including the "developers, developers, developers" chant in September 2000—weren't corporate theater but genuine attempts to maintain morale when the company believed it might be broken up.
The second priority involved cleaning up the antitrust mess through Brad Smith's systematic approach to settling disputes worldwide. Ballmer's third priority was ensuring Microsoft continued growing while building new businesses for the future, producing the enterprise transformation that became Microsoft's greatest success and championing the Azure investment despite internal resistance.
Satya Nadella
Satya Nadella's ascension to CEO represented both continuity and transformation for Microsoft, combining deep institutional knowledge with fresh strategic perspective. His journey through the company began in 1992 as a Windows NT evangelist, progressing through enterprise software roles including BizTalk, SQL Server, and eventually Bing leadership.
Steve Ballmer's decision to promote Nadella to lead Server & Tools in 2011 was explicitly designed to prepare him for CEO succession while ensuring Azure's successful integration. When Nadella became CEO in February 2014, his "mobile-first, cloud-first" strategy emphasized meeting customers where they were rather than forcing them into Microsoft-centric ecosystems, exemplified by his immediate decision to ship the previously shelved Office for iPad.
Powers
Scale Economies:
Microsoft's massive user base enabled the company to amortize R&D investments across hundreds of millions of users, making incremental product improvements economically viable that smaller competitors couldn't justify
The enterprise business benefited from enormous scale in serving large corporate customers, allowing Microsoft to invest in comprehensive support infrastructure and specialized vertical solutions
Switching Costs:
Enterprise Agreements created multi-year contractual commitments that made it extremely difficult for customers to transition to competitive solutions mid-contract
The integrated nature of Microsoft's enterprise stack (Active Directory, Exchange, SharePoint, Office) created technical switching costs where changing one component required wholesale infrastructure replacement
Employee training and institutional knowledge around Microsoft products represented substantial switching costs for enterprise customers
Playbook
Culture Shift: Microsoft's experience demonstrated how prolonged flat stock performance creates destructive zero-sum internal dynamics where employees compete against each other rather than external competitors. When the company's stock price remained stagnant for over a decade despite tripling revenue and profits, employees became convinced that individual advancement could only come at colleagues' expense. This dynamic was amplified by stack ranking systems that forced managers to distribute performance ratings on a curve, creating an environment where collaboration suffered and internal politics flourished. The lesson for other companies is that growth narratives and external validation are crucial for maintaining healthy organizational culture.
Fighting Against Technological Tides: Microsoft's experience in the 2000s illustrated the futility of trying to force users into preferred behaviors rather than embracing emerging trends. The company spent enormous resources fighting open source adoption, web-based applications, and mobile platforms, ultimately losing market position and developer mindshare. The eventual success of the Satya Nadella era came from reversing this approach—embracing Linux, supporting competing platforms, and building services that met users where they wanted to be. Companies must recognize when technological shifts represent unstoppable user preferences rather than temporary fads that can be countered through superior products or marketing.
Timing, Implementation and Taste Were Terrible: Despite having prescient vision about future technology trends, Microsoft consistently struggled with timing and implementation during this period. The company correctly predicted tablet computing, touch interfaces, mobile platforms, and cloud services years before these markets matured, but repeatedly bet on wrong technical standards or user paradigms. Touch computing succeeded through capacitive screens rather than resistive stylus input; tablets emerged as scaled-up phones rather than scaled-down PCs; mobile platforms required app ecosystems rather than desktop compatibility. This pattern suggests that being early with correct vision can be as dangerous as being late, particularly when early implementations create market confusion or user resistance.
Multiple Bets Worked Earlier, But Not In This Era: Microsoft's historical success with "bracketing"—developing multiple parallel approaches to emerging markets—broke down during this period as the company focused resources on single bets that often proved incorrect. Previously successful parallel development of Windows and OS/2, or web browsers versus interactive TV, gave way to all-in commitments like Windows 8's touch-first approach or Windows Phone's enterprise-centric strategy. The loss of this optionality-preserving approach contributed to major strategic misses, suggesting that companies facing technological uncertainty should maintain multiple smaller bets rather than making large singular commitments.
Positive Sum Leadership: The Bill Gates-Steve Ballmer partnership illustrated how complementary leadership strengths can create dramatically more value than individual capabilities. Gates provided technical vision and willingness to change direction based on new data, while Ballmer contributed operational excellence and organizational alignment. Together, they achieved strategic flexibility with execution consistency—Gates would recognize technological shifts and Ballmer would mobilize the organization to respond. When this partnership dissolved due to external pressures, Microsoft lost much of its strategic agility, highlighting how rare and valuable truly complementary leadership teams can be.
Partnership Is a Blessing and a Curse: Microsoft's extensive partner ecosystem provided tremendous market reach but created constraints on strategic flexibility that prevented the kind of platform resets that enabled competitors like Apple to leapfrog into new markets. The company's obligations to OEMs, resellers, developers, and enterprise customers made it difficult to execute radical strategic pivots, instead requiring evolutionary changes that often proved insufficient for new technological paradigms. While partnership-dependent business models can create durable competitive advantages, they also limit companies' ability to respond quickly to disruptive technologies that require fundamental business model changes.
Quintessence
David: The Narrative Imperative: Microsoft's greatest failure during this period was not operational but narrative—the company's inability to tell its story effectively to investors, customers, and the broader technology community. Despite tripling revenue and profits while building Azure and other foundational technologies, Microsoft was perceived as irrelevant and failing throughout Steve Ballmer's tenure. The company's stock price remained flat for over a decade not because of poor business performance, but because stakeholders couldn't understand or believe in Microsoft's strategic direction. This contrasts sharply with companies like Amazon, which successfully framed their failures as "invention and wandering" while maintaining investor confidence despite numerous high-profile product failures. The lesson is that narrative management is not peripheral to business strategy but central to it—companies must invest as much in explaining their strategy as in executing it.
Ben: Technological Disruption's Inevitability: Microsoft's experience illustrates that technology companies face constant existential risk regardless of current market dominance or financial success. Even without antitrust challenges, Microsoft would likely have struggled with mobile platforms because Google's search-based business model enabled them to offer Android for "less than free"—a competitive dynamic that Microsoft's traditional software licensing couldn't match. This pattern extends beyond Microsoft: dominant technology companies inevitably face challenges from competitors operating under different economic models or serving different customer needs. The implication is that technology leadership requires constant reinvention and platform shifts, as yesterday's competitive advantages become tomorrow's constraints. Success in technology is temporary by nature, making paranoia and continuous adaptation essential survival traits.
Carveouts
David's Recommendations:
Meta Ray-Bans: Smart glasses providing ambient audio without earbuds, particularly useful for baby monitoring while maintaining conversation ability
Ozlo Sleepbuds: Sleep-optimized audio devices from former Bose engineers, designed for side sleepers with low-profile construction
Ben's Recommendations:
M3 MacBook Air: Lightweight, high-performance laptop ideal for travel and mobile productivity
Tesla Model Y: Electric vehicle praised for its iPhone-like user experience and comprehensive Supercharger network access
Additional Notes
Episode Metadata:
Title: Microsoft Volume II
Season/Episode: Season 14, Episode 6
Release Date: July 21, 2024
Duration: 4 hours, 48 minutes, 27 seconds
Related Episodes:
Microsoft Volume I (Season 14, Episode 4)
Amazon Web Services (Season 11, Episode 3)
Nvidia Part I: The GPU Company (Season 10, Episode 5)
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